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Abstract. Classically, gratitude is a  tri-polar construal, logically ordering 
a  benefactor, a  benefice, and a  beneficiary in a  favour-giving-receiving 
situation. Grammatically, the poles are distinguished and bound together by 
the prepositions ‘to’ and ‘for’; so I  call this classic concept ‘to-for’ gratitude. 
Classic religious gratitude follows this schema, with God as the benefactor. 
Such gratitude, when felt, is a religious experience, and a reliable readiness or 
‘habit’ of such construal is a religious virtue. However, atheists have sometimes 
felt an urge or need for an analogous experience and virtue of gratitude, and 
theists sometimes feel intellectual discomfort with classical theistic gratitude 
on consideration of the misfortunes that characterize our life along with its 
blessings. In response, another conception of religious gratitude has been 
attempted, a  construal that lacks the to-for structure. This paper probes the 
significance of the benefactor for gratitude, both secular and religious, and, with 
Søren Kierkegaard’s help, some features of the theology of classical religious 
gratitude that dissolve the problem of misfortunes.
I. CLASSICAL GRATITUDE TO PEOPLE
The vast majority of discussions of gratitude in psychology and 
philosophy, both historical and contemporary, suppose that to be 
grateful is to acknowledge gladly the receipt of some benefit, favour, or 
gift, and the good will or benevolent intention of the giver of the benefit 
towards the recipient. The abstract structure of gratitude so conceived is 
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A is grateful to B for C. I call such tri-polar gratitude ‘to-for’ gratitude. 
A’s acknowledgment of B as the intentional source of C is not just verbal 
behaviour, but a glad or happy state of mind. The recipient is glad about 
two things: the benefit that he or she has received, and the benevolent 
attitude of the giver in giving it. Thus, in one sense of the word, gratitude 
is a happy attitude about a benevolent attitude. Another sense of the word 
derives from this one. We may also speak of a grateful person, meaning 
that the individual is reliably disposed to take this attitude toward benefits 
as received from benefactors. Most people, though not all (Aristotle 
1980: 4.3; Morgan, Gulliford & Kristjánsson 2014), have thought of this 
disposition as a human excellence or virtue. The most thorough extant 
ancient account of gratitude, both as a virtue and as an emotion, is that 
of the Stoic Seneca (4 BCE–65 CE), in his De Beneficiis (On Benefits).
In Seneca’s discussion, gratitude (gratia) is above all an attitude toward 
a benefactor, somebody who has done us a favour. The favour may be any 
of a wide variety of things – shelter, protection from harm, defence of 
our reputation, a listening ear, a gift or loan of money, instruction about 
something, rescue from danger, diversion from a bad choice, supportive 
presence in a  time of distress, etc. (for the variety of possibilities, see 
de Ben. 1.5.1, 2.34.5, 2.35.3, 3.9.2). The material ‘benefit’ is really but 
a symbol of good will:
If I have saved a man’s children from shipwreck or a fire and restored 
them to him, and afterwards they were snatched from him either by 
sickness or some injustice of fortune, yet, even when they are no more, 
the benefit that was manifested in their persons endures. All those things, 
therefore, which falsely assume the name of benefits, are but the services 
through which a  friendly will reveals itself ... what counts is, not what 
is done or what is given, but the spirit of the action, because a benefit 
consists, not in what is done or given, but in the intention of the giver or 
doer. (1.5.4–5, 1.6.1)
The agency of the benefactor is thus more important than its product. 
The overriding salience of the benefactor in the mind of the grateful 
person is due to his or her sensitivity to the benevolent attitude with 
which the giver bestowed the benefit. The benefit plays a definite role, but 
according to Seneca, in the mind of the truly grateful person its role is 
chiefly that of indicating the graciousness of the benefactor’s mind toward 
the beneficiary. The grateful response is a heartfelt appreciative (joyful, 
benevolent) recognition of the graciousness of the benefactor (1.15.4). 
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Seneca is sternly critical of a  mercenary attitude on the part of either 
the benefactor (as making his favour leverage for advantage or power or 
pleasure or glory (4.11.1)) or the beneficiary (as grasping the benefit in 
disregard of the benefactor (4.20.3)). The generosity-gratitude exchange 
as Seneca describes it is above all a meeting of the minds of two human 
beings – a mutual recognition of positive regard often utilizing a ‘material’ 
benefit as medium and symbol. The ideal giver uses the bestowed benefit 
to show his regard for the beneficiary, and the beneficiary uses a token 
benefit – a word of thanks, a smile, warmth of demeanour, or a return 
benefit – to show his positive regard for the benefactor’s positive regard.
The worldview or ethics to which Seneca’s conception of gratitude 
belongs stands in subtle contrast with that of Thomas Hobbes, who also 
accords gratitude the status of a virtue. Hobbes comments,
As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant; so does gratitude depend 
on antecedent grace; that is to say, antecedent free gift; and is the fourth 
law of nature ... : that a  man which receiveth benefit from another of 
mere grace endeavour that he which giveth it have no reasonable cause 
to repent him of his good will. For no man giveth but with intention 
of good to himself, because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, 
the object is to every man his own good; of which if men see they shall 
be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor 
consequently of mutual help ... (Leviathan, Part I, chapter 15, p. 230)
Bernard Gert (2010: 95) says this passage shows that Hobbesian gratitude 
isn’t merely a  device for extracting future benefits from benefactors. 
But to my ear it leaves the question of the beneficiary’s deeper motive 
open, and the egoism suggested by ‘no man giveth but with intention of 
good to himself ’ seems to say that in the exchange both benefactor and 
beneficiary are primarily looking out for their own advantage. The accent 
in Hobbesian gratitude is on the benefit, to which the benefactor plays 
the secondary or derivative role of supplier. Whether or not Hobbes had 
this in mind, it provides an instructive contrast with Seneca’s view, which 
makes human fellowship, friendship, and love the primary value in the 
generosity-gratitude exchange. To exaggerate a  tiny bit, the benefice 
plays more the role of a pawn in the essentially interpersonal or spiritual 
communion of souls.
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II. CLASSICAL CHRISTIAN GRATITUDE
Thanksgiving is a central practice of the Christian life, and it follows the 
schema of to-for gratitude. A classic expression is the prayer of General 
Thanksgiving in the Book of Common Prayer:
Almighty God, Father of all mercies, we, thine unworthy servants, 
do give thee most humble and hearty thanks for all thy goodness and 
loving-kindness to us and to all men; We bless thee for our creation, 
preservation, and all the blessings of this life; but above all, for thine 
inestimable love in the redemption of the world by our Lord Jesus Christ; 
for the means of grace, and for the hope of glory. And, we beseech 
thee, give us that due sense of all thy mercies, that our hearts may be 
unfeignedly thankful; and that we show forth thy praise, not only with 
our lips, but in our lives, by giving up our selves to thy service, and by 
walking before thee in holiness and righteousness all our days; through 
Jesus Christ our Lord, to whom, with thee and the Holy Ghost, be all 
honour and glory, world without end. Amen.
By this prayer, worshipers express and communicate to God our 
recognition of his ‘goodness and lovingkindness’. We then enumerate, in 
a general way, the tokens of God’s generosity: our creation, preservation, 
and all the blessings of this life; and the redemption of the world by Jesus 
Christ. Then we petition God to strengthen and purify our gratitude, so 
that we may live our lives in happy appreciation and glad communion 
with God. Gratitude is a  kind of love, and this prayer is a  device for 
maintaining and deepening our love for God. Thanksgiving is a practice 
of love.
III. ANOTHER KIND OF RELIGIOUS GRATITUDE?
Christians and other theists are not the only people who are inclined 
to feel gratitude for things not plausibly attributable to human agency. 
Atheists too sometimes feel this impulse. Robert Solomon thinks that 
a  person who feels grateful for his life as such ‘is a  better person and 
a  happier one’ than someone who lacks such gratitude, and empirical 
research on the question seems to bear him out (Emmons 2013). ‘But 
one of the questions that has always intrigued me about such cosmic 
gratitude, and it certainly bothered Nietzsche as well, is to whom 
should one feel this gratitude?’ Solomon says that ‘being grateful “to the 
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universe” is a limp way out of this quandary’ (Solomon 2004: viii). The 
limpness obviously derives from the fact that the universe seems not to 
be an intentional agent, and gratitude attributes benevolent agency to the 
source of one’s blessings.
Solomon chides Albert Camus for commending, by way of his 
hero Meursault (The Stranger), that one open one’s heart to ‘the benign 
indifference of the universe’. He seems to suppose that Camus is 
representing Meursault’s emotion as gratitude, though that is implausible 
and the text doesn’t say it. It seems to me that if one is expecting to be 
guillotined before an approving crowd in the next few hours, one might 
feel hemmed in by hostile forces, and thus might experience some relief 
or even joy by construing the universe as indifferent (agents can be 
indifferent to this or that, but non-agents are necessarily ‘indifferent’). 
This relief will be a  member of the class of ‘transcendent’ or ‘cosmic’ 
emotions. The indifference of the universe could strike one as benign 
by comparison with all the hostile human beings in one’s recent and 
expected experience  – see the ‘howls of execration’ that Meursault 
anticipates from the crowd who will gleefully watch his execution. 
Throughout the novel, Meursault has remarked that nothing matters, 
nothing is really important; so his descent into terror in face of the 
guillotine represents an inconsistency in his worldview, which he now 
corrects by reverting to his characteristic construal of the universe as 
indifferent. But if Meursault’s transcendent relief is not gratitude, then 
Camus isn’t even trying to supply an answer to Solomon’s question about 
‘to whom’.
Nietzsche, by contrast, does seem to be addressing the question of the 
to whom with his ungrammatical question, ‘How could I fail to be grateful 
to my whole life?’ (Nietzsche 1967: 221) He seems to answer to whom? 
By saying, ‘To myself ’, or ‘to my whole life’ (if these are different). This 
is perhaps an improvement over ‘to the universe’, inasmuch as Nietzsche 
is an intentional agent, somebody who can will the good for him(self). 
Apparently, Seneca had an  interlocutor who thought like Nietzsche, 
and offers him a short tutorial in the logical grammar of interpersonal 
transaction words:
‘One ought’, you say, ‘to bestow benefit on oneself; therefore one ought 
also to return gratitude to oneself ’. [But] ... the man who gives to himself 
is not generous, nor is he who pardons himself merciful, nor he who is 
touched by his own misfortunes compassionate. For generosity, mercy, 
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and compassion contribute to others .... If a man says that he has sold 
something to himself, will he not be thought mad? For selling means 
alienation, the transferring of one’s property and one’s right in it to 
another. Yet, just as is the case in selling, giving implies the relinquishment 
of something, the surrendering of something that you have held to the 
possession of another. ... unless there are two persons, there can be no 
giving ... (De Beneficiis 5.9–10)
So we can’t owe our whole life to ourselves.
Solomon himself proposes a way to be grateful for our life without 
being grateful to either God or the universe. He says, ‘ ... opening one’s 
heart to the universe is not so much personifying the universe as opening 
one’s heart, that is, expanding one’s perspective’ (2004: ix). He seems to be 
saying that we can be grateful for our whole life if 1) we think about our 
whole life, not just its particularities, while also 2) reflecting about how 
much of the good in our life we owe to parents, friends, teachers, and 
the like. If we make a habit of doing these two things, in alternation or in 
conjunction, then we will learn not to insist on being the primary authors 
of our life, and will acquire the habit of acknowledging, generously and 
realistically, how much we owe to others. This generalized attitude of 
grateful indebtedness can count, Solomon thinks, as gratitude for our 
whole life. We will be cognizant, of course, that we don’t owe our life 
as a whole to any one of those human agents that we acknowledge, nor 
even to all of them collectively. Human agency cannot account for our 
whole life. Yet we do owe some aspects of it to diverse human agents, 
some of whom, at least, will probably have helped us from motives of 
benevolence. This solution seems to depend on confusing the various 
aspects of our life that we do owe to others with our whole life, which 
we cannot owe to other human beings. This is not what Solomon calls 
‘cosmic gratitude’, but a broadened gratitude to people.
George Nakhnikian tells of a cosmic gratitude he experienced when 
his eighteen-month old daughter had a close encounter with death. He 
was chatting with friends in his home while their children played together, 
when he suddenly realized that he didn’t know where the baby was. In 
a  mild panic he found the porch’s screen door ajar, and a  neighbour 
approaching him with the child in her arms. The neighbour had found 
her standing in the middle of the street looking at the housetops.
A car driven by elderly people had come to a stop just in front of her. 
Apparently they were waiting for her to get out of the way. In the 
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meantime, another car, driven by some impatient youngsters, had come 
up behind the first car. The youngsters could not see the baby, so they 
impatiently zoomed around the first car. The baby stood still while 
this was going on. If she had taken two steps in the wrong direction at 
a certain moment, she would have been killed instantly.
I took the child in my arms. She was calm and happy, her usual self. 
She had no idea of what had happened. I thanked our neighbor for her 
kindness. But what I felt at that moment was a vast thankfulness which 
I could not appropriately express to any human being. ... Had I retained 
the religion of my fathers, I  should have thanked God in my heart, 
I  should have gone to the nearest Armenian church to light a  candle 
before the image of a  saint, and I  should have given the priest some 
money for the poor. (Nakhnikian 1961: 161)
Nakhnikian frankly attests to a  certain frustration, one noted as well 
in the testimonies of Solomon and Nietzsche. The frustration arises 
from a strong sense that the emotion he feels has the to-for structure, 
combined with an equally strong resistance to following the ‘to’ with the 
only agent that qualifies for the role, namely God. Nakhnikian thinks 
his experience is a universal human susceptibility, not a vestige of his 
Christian upbringing. Like those who cope by thanking the universe, 
or themselves, or all the people that have contributed to their life, 
Nakhnikian finds some comfort in the finite:
Ever since the day I have recalled, I have felt a special tenderness for my 
child. When I see her sitting at the family table at mealtime, or when she 
comes home from school, I often reach over to stroke her hair, as if to say, 
‘Thank you for being here.’ Also, what I am doing now, telling the story, is 
a way of externalizing what I feel. (Nakhnikian 1961: 162)
Nakhnikian is admirably honest in his tone of resignation that none of 
his ‘externalizing’ strategies is completely satisfying.
The continuing frustration of deflecting the ‘to whom’ of to-for 
cosmic gratitude onto unsatisfactory objects may lie behind Brother 
David Steindl-Rast’s program as outlined in his essay, ‘Gratitude as 
Thankfulness and as Gratefulness’ (in Emmons and McCullough 2004). 
Brother David proposes to distinguish two different kinds of gratitude: 
thankfulness, which is ‘personal’, and gratefulness, which is ‘transpersonal’.
When we thank, we think – namely, in terms of giver, gift, and receiver. 
This is necessary for personal gratitude, but transpersonal gratitude  – 
though cognitive – lies deeper than thinking and precedes it. When it is 
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an integral element of the experience of universal wholeness, gratitude 
does not yet distinguish between giver, gift, and receiver. (Steindl-Rast 
2004: 286)
It is hard to know what difference Brother David is seeing between 
cognition and thinking. If we take Nakhnikian’s experience as an example, 
it would seem that, even though he describes the emotion as ‘cosmic’, 
it involves thinking. For example, he reckons with the danger that his 
daughter has just been in, as well as her safety, and both thoughts are 
essential to his cosmic emotion. In fact, her safety is the ‘gift’ for which 
he is grateful, and the danger of being run over is what she is safe from. 
(That these thoughts condition his feeling of gratitude is consistent with 
the feeling arising ‘spontaneously’ (notwithstanding Steindl-Rast 2004: 
285).) Nakhnikian is also aware that no finite agent is a good candidate 
for thanking. Another example of cosmic gratitude that he mentions 
follows on the thought of ‘the sheer brute contingency of [one’s] ever 
having been born’ (Nakhnikian 1961: 159). Here the ‘gift’ is life – the fact 
that, despite the odds against it, one was born. One feels grateful for one’s 
life – again, with the awareness that no person ‘within the world’, so to 
speak, is the proper benefactor.
Moreover, when Brother David comes to describe (cosmic) 
gratefulness more definitely, he seems to forsake his thesis that it ‘does 
not yet distinguish between giver, gift, and receiver’ (Steindl-Rast 2004: 
286). He says that gratitude is a heightened appreciation, or ‘celebration’, 
that ‘differs from all other celebrations by its object, that is, undeserved 
kindness’ (Steindl-Rast 2004: 283, my italics). Brother David thinks this 
will be true of all gratitude, whether personal or cosmic. The undeserved 
kindnesses that persons do for us, and that deserve our thankfulness, 
are of many different kinds. The undeserved kindness that the cosmos 
does us, and that deserves our gratefulness, is ‘undeserved admittance 
into a  state of mutual belonging’ (Steindl-Rast 2004: 284). That is, in 
feeling cosmic gratefulness, we ‘celebrate’ our inclusion in being. It is as 
though the universe welcomes us into a state of mutual belonging: in its 
kindness, the universe enfolds us, presents itself to us as ‘kin’ (Steindl-
Rast 2004: 284), to us who don’t deserve such welcome. It belongs to us 
and we belong to it. To me, this kindness of the universe sounds very 
much like a personification of it. The universe is construed as a kind of 
benevolent giver, whose gift is itself, like a mother who ‘gives herself ’ to 
her child, so that she belongs to the child and the child belongs to her. So 
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the to-for structure is preserved, after all: gratefulness is to the cosmos 
for its kind and welcoming inclusiveness. We are reminded of Robert 
Solomon’s comment that ‘being grateful “to the universe” is a limp way 
out of this quandary’ (Solomon 2004: viii). No doubt, it’s to avoid this 
criticism that Brother David insists, in effect, that gratefulness does 
not, like thankfulness, have the to-for structure. ‘Only thankfulness ... 
typically has as its object an intentional agent beyond the self ’ (Steindl-
Rast 2004: 286). But his insistence that it does not take a personal agent 
as ‘object’ conflicts with his description of transcendent gratitude in 
such person-suggestive words as ‘undeserved kindness’ and ‘kinship’ 
and ‘belonging’. I  suspect that if one tried to do completely without 
personifying concepts, the description would fail plausibly to describe 
a kind of gratitude.
IV. COSMIC EMOTIONS OTHER THAN GRATITUDE
Many cosmic emotions have come to the attention of philosophers and 
theologians, and some of them differ strikingly from the gratitude on 
which Solomon, Nakhnikian, and Brother David focus. The various 
species of transcendent emotion are distinguished by the patterns of 
thought that give rise to them and internally determine the specific 
character of each. Let’s return for a  moment to Nakhnikian’s thought 
of ‘the sheer brute contingency of [your] ever having been born’ 
(Nakhnikian 1961: 159), which he says might generate a feeling of cosmic 
gratitude for your life. But it seems that, to yield gratitude, the thought of 
sheer contingency needs to be combined with the thought of your life as 
something like an undeserved kindness, to borrow from Brother David. 
It won’t yield gratitude if you don’t think of your life as something good 
for yourself. If you hate your life, the thought of your radical contingency 
might yield cosmic anger about your colossally bad luck!
In a  lecture at the Center of Theological Inquiry (Princeton, New 
Jersey), March 13, 2014, Doug Ottati reported explaining to his son 
Albert how each of a very long string of extremely unlikely coincidences 
had to occur for Albert’s dad to meet Albert’s mom (Ottati 2014). Albert 
then remarked, ‘Well, if you hadn’t met Mom, then I guess somebody 
else would have been my dad.’ In this response, Albert is expressing 
a sentiment that is very natural for human beings, the gut feeling that 
I have to be, that my existence is a non-negotiable given. Albert had a very 
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solid sense of the necessity of his being, a sense that Doug’s explanation 
was designed to undermine. When Albert does finally come clearly 
and forcefully to see the nearly infinite improbability of his ever having 
existed, the feeling generated by this insight, against the background of 
Albert’s sense of his own necessity, is likely to be an  anxious sense of 
cosmic unsupportedness, a feeling that is quite the opposite of cosmic 
gratitude.
A  similar feeling that seems to be an  antithesis of Brother David’s 
‘gratefulness’ is one that Martin Heidegger describes as feeling anxiously 
‘uncanny’ (unheimlich  – not at home, nicht-zuhause) (see Heidegger 
1962: 231–3; and Roberts 1977: 254–5 for discussion). Heidegger, 
like other ‘existentialists’, is highly sensitive to the fact that human 
consciousness ‘projects’ into the future, into a  potentially wide-open 
‘world’ of possibilities. But he also stresses that human beings are typically 
‘fallen’ into closed physical, social, and ideological niches of their own 
and others’ making, in which they comfortably and inauthentically live 
in ‘oblivion’ of their true nature as beings radically open to possibility. 
This artificially closed world has the homey character heimlichkeit, 
comfortable and complacent identity-giving familiarity. But on occasion, 
a  person’s true nature as open possibility makes itself obtrusively 
manifest, and his familiar world of commonplaces and conveniences 
and habits and predictabilities fails him and ceases to be ‘home’ for him. 
This anxious sense of out-thereness, this feeling of uncanniness, of not 
belonging to one’s world, is in some ways the polar opposite of Brother 
David’s feeling of the undeserved welcoming kinship of the universe. 
The two cosmic feelings are as different from one another as anxiety and 
gratitude in ordinary intra-world experience. Just as cosmic ‘gratitude’ 
can be experienced as a connection to God, anxious cosmic uncanniness 
can be experienced as a yearning for God, though Heidegger seems to 
warn against interpreting his own analysis in this way (Heidegger 1962: 
233; Roberts 1977: 255, note 14).
Ludwig Wittgenstein mentions two other transcendent emotions in 
his famous ‘Lecture on Ethics’. One is a kind of wonder or awe, and the 
other is a sense of security.
I believe the best way of describing [this experience] is to say that when 
I have it I wonder at the existence of the world. And I am then inclined 
to use such phrases as ‘how extraordinary that anything should exist’ or 
‘how extraordinary that the world should exist’. I will mention another 
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experience straight away which I  also know and which others of you 
might be acquainted with: it is, what one might call, the experience of 
feeling absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is inclined 
to say ‘I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens’. (Wittgenstein 
1965: 8)
When we wonder at something extraordinary, like a Turner landscape or 
Bach’s B minor Mass, we focus our attention on it and implicitly compare 
it with other things that have been created by some process that we 
think we understand; and we are dumbfounded that the extraordinary 
thing was created – say, by a human mind and skill. But in the case of 
the transcendent wonder that Wittgenstein describes, we think of the 
whole of reality as an artefact, and are struck dumbfounded by the fact 
of its being in existence at all. When we feel safe in an ordinary way, say 
from being mugged in an upper class suburb, we think of harm from 
a certain quarter, say from marauding drug addicts on the streets, and 
note that here in the suburbs there’s little or no danger from that quarter. 
Similarly, when we feel absolutely safe – safe from any possible harm – 
we survey the harms that might befall us, such as disease, starvation, 
death, calumny, torture, loss of family and friends, etc., and, adopting 
a  perspective outside the world, so to speak, feel that even if all such 
‘harms’ should befall us at once, we would still be fine.
Some of the transcendent or cosmic emotions generate, by their inner 
logic, little or no motive to posit a transcendent or divine agent. Cosmic 
wonder, for example, or the feeling of absolute safety, Heidegger’s 
anxious feeling of being ‘not at home’ in the world, or Meursault’s 
feeling that the universe’s utter indifference to him is benign, do not in 
themselves suggest an  agent who created the world, or who is calling 
one home or keeping one safe, or who has good will towards oneself; 
though it is true that theists may connect such feelings with the doctrines 
of creation or providence or grace (see Wittgenstein’s comments, 1965: 
9). But the philosophical discussions of transcendent gratitude that we 
have considered do seem to have in common that they motivate a search 
for somebody to whom the gratitude is to be directed. Solomon ends up 
directing his ‘expanded perspective’ gratitude to teachers, friends, family, 
and other human beings. Nakhnikian thinks nostalgically of the forsaken 
God of his fathers, and ends by (irrationally) thanking his daughter for 
‘being there’. Nietzsche, again irrationally, thanks himself or his whole 
life. And Brother David ends up construing the universe as offering 
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‘undeserved kindness’, as being like hospitable ‘kin’ with whom (which?) 
we can enter into a ‘mutual belonging’. The explanation of this difference 
is near at hand. Gratitude has the to-for structure. Other emotion types in 
the neighbourhood of gratitude do not have it, for example, Meursault’s 
cosmic relief that the universe, being indifferent to him, is not like the 
crowds eagerly waiting to see the knife slice through his neck, or the 
simple joy at the existence of the world that Brother David sometimes 
takes to be gratitude (see Steindl-Rast 1984).
Bob Solomon, Brother David, Nietzsche, and George Nakhnikian 
all feel a  theistic temptation stemming from their feelings of cosmic 
gratitude, and propose devices for escaping it. I have argued that their 
escape routes are dead-ends as long as the feeling they experience is 
gratitude rather than, say, relief or joy. The reason, I have argued, is that 
gratitude has the to-for structure. But atheists are not the only ones to 
have trouble with cosmic gratitude. If theists take what they perceive 
as the blessings in their lives to be favours expressing the benevolence 
of God towards them, warranting them to love God in return and to 
express this love in worship and thanksgiving and benevolent actions 
toward God’s creatures, especially their fellow human beings – are they 
not, in logical consistency, committed to being hostile towards God on 
account of what they perceive as the troubles, disasters, adversities, trials, 
and tragedies in their lives? I turn now to Søren Kierkegaard’s treatment 
of religious gratitude, which quite directly addresses this question.
V. TO-FOR COSMIC GRATITUDE
Kierkegaard explores the peculiar features of a  frankly theistic cosmic 
gratitude that has the to-for structure. In ordinary human-human 
gratitude, we usually take ourselves to be pretty good judges of the 
value of whatever holds the place of benefit in our tri-polar construal, 
and our judgment of that value influences our sense of our benefactor’s 
benevolence. Very roughly speaking, the more wonderful the benefit, 
the more wonderful do we judge the benevolence; the less wonderful 
the ‘benefit’, the less wonderful the benevolence, all the way down to 
downright malevolence. (We don’t generally attribute benevolence to 
people who give us a poke in the eye with a sharp stick.) Very roughly 
speaking, I say: even with human benefactors, we soon realize that their 
motives are mixed and their calculations of our good are fallible. Their 
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benevolence may be mixed with other motives for the good they do 
us, perhaps even with envy or some other kind of malevolence; their 
calculations are fallible, so we may be genuinely benefited by their 
efforts to hurt us, and the good they intend for us by their favours may 
misfire, even tragically. Or they may be so much wiser than we that the 
genuine good they do us may look to us like evil; and then it may be 
proper, despite appearances, to infer the goodness of the benefit from the 
benefactor’s wise benevolence. Nevertheless, on the whole we consider 
ourselves pretty good judges of the quality of benefits that come to us 
from one another, and if we are virtuously grateful people, on the model 
commended to us by Seneca, we will value the giver above the gift, and so 
will generously tend to put the best construction on the giver’s motives.
With God, the connection between what appears to us to be a benefit 
or a calamity and the intention of its agent is less naturally transparent, 
to put the point mildly. In a footnote from the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, Johannes Climacus quotes a ‘religious’ person who seems not 
to have noted this point:
After many errors I finally learned to keep close to God, and since that 
time He has not left me in the lurch; my business flourishes, my projects 
have success, I am now happily married, and my children are well and 
strong, etc. (Kierkegaard 1941: 399)
The pattern of thought this person expresses is not really religious, 
says Climacus, but ‘aesthetic’: the goods he lists are to him (given his 
character) unambiguously and even ultimately good, and their reversal 
would be to him unambiguously bad. But to the really religious person 
this would not be so. Climacus continues:
 ... even if it pleases him to say that he thanks God for all these blessings, 
the question is how he thanks Him, whether he does it directly, or 
whether he first executes the movement of incertitude which is the mark 
of the God-relationship. Just as little as a man has the right in the midst 
of misfortune to say to God directly that it is misfortune, since he has 
to suspend his understanding in the movement of incertitude, so little 
dare he directly take all these things as evidence of the God-relationship. 
(Kierkegaard 1941: 399)
Climacus is saying that it’s fine to thank God for these mundane 
blessings, as long as one’s thanks are firmly subject to a  proviso: were 
these blessings taken from me, my gratitude to you, O God, would continue 
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unabated – not unchanged, perhaps, but unabated. This is, I think, what 
the prayer of General Thanksgiving of the Book of Common Prayer has 
in mind when it reads, ‘We bless thee for our creation, preservation, and 
all the blessings of this life; but above all, for thine inestimable love in 
the redemption of the world by our Lord Jesus Christ; for the means of 
grace, and for the hope of glory.’ That is, thanks for the God-relationship 
is always proper, takes precedence over thanks for the blessings of this 
life, and persists through the thick and the thin of the latter blessings. 
It persists, that is, in the person whose cosmic gratitude is a Christian 
virtue, a firm and stable trait of character marked by the wisdom of the 
proviso.
A little later in the same footnote, Climacus comments on a case in 
which the religious gratitude is not a trait of character, but is subject to 
the ups and downs of the blessings of this life:
Thus the great actor Sydelmann (as I see from his biography by Rotschel) 
on the evening of his triumph in the Opera House, where he was 
crowned with a  laurel wreath amid applause lasting several minutes, 
when he came home, passionately gave thanks to God. With the same 
passion with which he gave thanks he would have rebelled against God 
if he had been hissed off the stage. Had he given thanks religiously, and 
hence given thanks to God, the Berlin public and the laurel wreath and 
the applause lasting several minutes would have become ambiguous in 
the dialectical uncertainty of the religious. (Kierkegaard 1941: 399)
I’m not sure how Climacus knows the final counterfactual (perhaps it’s 
clear from the biography), but the ‘ambiguity’ of which Climacus speaks 
would be Sydelmann’s appreciation of the ambiguity of the value of his 
theatrical success, in the light of the supreme value of his relationship 
with God. And this appreciation would be a  function of the order of 
Sydelmann’s cares: that his care for his friendship with God swamped 
and qualified his concern for theatrical successes so that he could forfeit 
the latter without despair.
Kierkegaard does not mean the religious relativizing of the concern 
for this life’s blessings to reduce it to Stoic indifference: ‘Is not that one 
who prides himself on not being able to sorrow in the day of sorrow put 
to shame by not being able to rejoice in the day of gladness?’ (Kierkegaard 
1943: 14). In an edifying discourse on Job from 1843 he refers to Job’s 
losses with words like ‘the terrible’, ‘horror’, and ‘distress’, and does not 
deny that Job suffers terribly, even though Job is a  paradigm for him 
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of religious gratitude as a  character trait. Kierkegaard introduces the 
discourse in the opening section by reflecting on the role that Job plays 
or can play in the life of subsequent generations. He acts as a beacon 
of comfort whose place is ‘the outpost of humanity’. He is a comfort to 
serious people,
... as one who witnesses that the terror is endured, the horror experienced, 
the battle of despair waged, to the honour of God, to his own salvation, 
to the profit and happiness of others. Job walks by the side of the race and 
guarantees it its happiness, combats the apprehensive dream that some 
horror may suddenly befall a man and have the power to destroy his soul 
as its certain prey. (Kierkegaard 1943: 9)
Some people don’t like to be reminded of Job, because his case calls 
them to be honest about the fragility of their ‘happiness’. Kierkegaard 
uses several terms of character-defect to describe such people. They 
are ‘thoughtless’ (1943: 9), or ‘selfish’ (1943: 9), or ‘defiant’ (1943: 9), or 
‘effeminate’ (1943: 10). For example,
Only the defiant could wish that Job had not existed, so that he might 
absolutely free his soul from the last vestiges of love which still remained 
in the plaintive shriek of despair; so that he might not complain, aye, even 
curse life; so that there might be no consonance of faith and confidence 
and humility in his speech; so that in his defiance he might stifle the 
shriek so that it might not even seem as if there were anyone whom it 
defied. (Kierkegaard 1943: 10)
Kierkegaard here describes someone who is so bitter about his loss that 
he doesn’t want to hear any word of comfort, refuses to allow even the 
love that his shriek of despair presupposes (you can’t even be desperate 
without caring positively about something). This person is so defiant that 
he shies even from admitting to himself that there is anyone to defy (like 
a poorly attached child who is so angry about his mother’s absence that 
he refuses to acknowledge her when she reappears).
The discourse is a  meditation on the words that Job spoke on 
finding out that his herds of oxen, asses, and camels had been stolen 
by marauders, his servants killed, and all his sons and daughters had 
perished when a  tornado struck the house in which they were eating 
and drinking together (Job 1:13–19): ‘Naked I came from my mother’s 
womb, and naked shall I return; the Lord gave, and the Lord has taken 
away; blessed be the name of the Lord.’
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In the first interpretive section of the discourse, Kierkegaard 
comments on the fact that, when lamenting what the Lord had taken 
away, Job mentions first what the Lord gave him. That is, in the midst 
of comprehensive disaster, Job first ‘counts his blessings’, and only then 
expresses the sadness of his loss. Then he worships God, acknowledging 
God as the source of all that he has (had), reaffirming his allegiance to 
God, and worshiping (honouring) him.
At the moment when the Lord took everything, [Job] did not say first, 
‘The Lord took’, but he said first, ‘The Lord gave’. The word is short, but 
in its brevity it perfectly expresses what it wishes to indicate, that Job’s 
soul is not crushed down in silent submission to sorrow, but that his 
heart first expanded in gratitude; that the loss of everything first made 
him thankful to the Lord that He had given him all the blessings that 
He now took from him. ... [The blessing] was not become less beautiful 
to him because it was taken away, nor more beautiful, but still beautiful 
as before, beautiful because the Lord gave it, and what now might 
seem more beautiful to him, was not the gift but the goodness of God. 
(Kierkegaard 1943: 15)
Thus Job’s religious gratitude is above all a personal relationship, with 
primary stress on the goodness of the benefactor, and treats the benefits 
as indicative of the benefactor’s benevolence.
Kierkegaard then describes three alternative scenarios, in which what 
might have seemed like religious gratitude turns out, in the face of loss, 
to have been a mere counterfeit and no real virtue. All three are marked 
by subordination of the appreciation of the giver to the apparent value 
of the gift in times past, now that the blessing has been withdrawn. In 
the first scenario, the subject’s memory of blessings past made the loss 
seem even bitterer, ‘and his ingratitude punished him by painting it as 
more desirable than it had previously been’ (Kierkegaard 1943: 17). In 
the second, the subject is tortured with regret that he did not more fully 
appreciate the benefits when he had them, and with a  forlorn desire 
that ‘he might only regain the glory for a  short time so that he might 
satiate himself with happiness, and thereby learn to disregard the pain!’ 
(Kierkegaard 1943: 17). In the third kind of case, of which Kierkegaard 
briefly describes several variants, the subject refuses to understand that 
he has lost the benefit, or denies that the benefit was really all that great 
anyway, or assures himself that the terrors of life are not really so hard to 
bear (Kierkegaard 1943: 18). By contrast, Job
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... confessed that the blessing of the Lord had been merciful to him, 
he returned thanks for it; therefore it did not remain in his mind as 
a torturing memory. He confessed that the Lord had blessed richly and 
beyond all measure his undertakings; he had been thankful for this, and 
therefore the memory did not become to him a consuming unrest. He 
did not conceal from himself that everything had been taken from him; 
therefore the Lord, who took it, remained in his upright soul. He did not 
avoid the thought that it was lost; therefore his soul rested quietly until 
the explanation of the Lord again came to him, and found his heart like 
the good earth well cultivated in patience. (Kierkegaard 1943: 19)
Next, Kierkegaard points out that Job frankly attributes the withdrawal 
of his blessings to the Lord’s agency. Of course he knows that Sabeans 
stole his asses and oxen and killed his servants, lightning destroyed the 
sheep and their shepherds, Chaldeans raided the camels and killed their 
keepers, and a violent wind overturned the house in which his children 
were making merry, burying them in the ruins. But he goes simply to 
the point: ‘the Lord has taken away.’ Again, Kierkegaard contrasts Job’s 
gratitude with the theological reflections of less hardy minds, who try to 
exonerate the Lord by driving a wedge between his agency and that of the 
Sabeans, the lightning, the Chaldeans, and the tornado (1943: 20–21). 
The verse following Job’s speech comments, ‘In all this Job did not sin or 
charge God with wrong’ (Job 1:22). The fault of the less hardy minds is 
that they insist on using their own standards of good and evil to judge 
the case, failing to apply ‘the dialectical uncertainty of the religious’ and 
to have faith that ‘in everything God works for good with those who love 
him’ (Romans 8:28).
Job ... did not retard his soul and extinguish his spirit in reflections or 
explanations which only engender and nourish doubt ... In the same 
instant that everything was taken from him he knew that it was the Lord 
who had taken it, and therefore in his loss he remained in understanding 
with the Lord; in his loss, he preserved his confidence in the Lord; he 
looked upon the Lord and therefore he did not see despair. (Kierkegaard 
1943: 21–22)
Because Job has the requisite humility and faith, he has no need to 
exonerate God. Job is steadfast in his allegiance to God and his belief in 
God’s goodness, regardless of the strangeness of God’s goodness to Job’s 
own preconception of what is good for Job. Unlike the actor Sydelmann, 
Job does not judge God’s goodness by Job’s preconception of what is 
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good for himself, but ‘suspend[ing] his understanding in the movement 
of incertitude’ realizes that God’s ways are not his ways, and generously 
gives God ‘the benefit of a  doubt’. In this steady grateful adherence 
to God he finds comfort in his sorrow and happiness in the midst of 
a devastated life.
CONCLUSION
Gratitude, as an  emotion distinct from other ‘positive’ emotions such 
as joy and relief, has the to-for structure: A  is grateful to B for C. It is 
thus a tri-polar construal: A beneficiary construes himself as beholden 
to a  benefactor for a  benefit. This conception seems to be widespread 
common sense, despite the fact that in casual discourse people sometimes 
say they are grateful when they are only glad, that is, when no benefactor 
is plausibly denoted. The significance of this observation is deepened 
when we consider that some of the profoundest thinkers about gratitude 
(e.g. Seneca and Kierkegaard) think that the virtue of gratitude involves 
a  conceptual subordination of the benefit to the benefactor, making 
gratitude a species of interpersonal love.
The to-for structure carries over to cosmic gratitude, where the 
natural candidate for benefactor is God. I’ve presented some evidence 
that even people who are decidedly unfriendly to the concept of God tend 
to presuppose the to-for structure in descriptions of their experiences of 
cosmic gratitude (gratitude for things that cannot be plausibly attributed 
to human agency). But those who are friendly to the concept of God 
also sometimes feel uncomfortable thanking God for blessings, because 
they feel that doing so commits them to being angry with God for 
misfortunes. In answer to this discomfort, I have outlined Kierkegaard’s 
conception of religious gratitude as a virtue, as a kind of love for God 
that steadfastly gives priority to the relationship with the Benefactor by 
subjecting all good and bad fortune to the ‘dialectical uncertainty of the 
religious’ – a kind of humble scepticism about the value of every benefit 
and detriment, in the light of God’s unchanging goodness.
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